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Melo: Protecting Persecuted Children

COMMENT
WHEN CHILDREN SUFFER:
THE FAILURE OF U.S.
IMMIGRATION LAW TO PROVIDE
PRACTICAL PROTECTION FOR
PERSECUTED CHILDREN
INTRODUCTION

Every year, mothers around the world face a devastating
choice. They can either stay in their home countries, where
their daughters are at risk of being subjected to female genital
mutilation (FGM), or they can flee to the United States, where
their children would potentially be eligible for asylum relief.
However, under existing U.s. immigration law, even if a child
is granted asylum, the immigration court will likely not
recognize an independent asylum claim for the mother. The
mother will then be ordered removed from the United States
and must face yet another devastating choice: either leave her
child behind in the U.S. or take her child back to her home
country, where persecution and permanent physical
disfigurement may await her.
Parents of minor children eligible for asylum face this
devastating situation, particularly in FGM cases. 1 The United
1 Although this Comment focuses on cases dealing with FGM, the purpose of
this work is not to argue for legislative change solely in the context of FGM cases but
rather for change as to derivative eligibility of parents of both asylee children and U.S.
citizen children who fear persecution if relocated to their parents' home countries.
"Female genital mutilation, or FGM, is the collective name given to a series of surgical
operations, involving the removal of some or all of the external genitalia, performed on
girls and women primarily in Africa and Asia. Often performed under unsanitary
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States Department of Justice recognizes that human-rights
violations against children can take a number of forms,
including abusive child labor practices, human-trafficking,
rape, forced prostitution, and forcible military recruitmene In
such cases, the parents may be ineligible for relief because they
cannot independently establish a well-founded fear of
persecution. 3 Parents are faced with this extremely difficult
decision because U.S. immigration law does not allow for
derivative asylum claims for parents of minor children. 4
conditions with highly rudimentary instruments, female genital mutilation is
'extremely painful,' 'permanently disfigures the female genitalia, land] exposes the girl
or woman to the risk of serious, potentially life-threatening complications,' including
'bleeding, infection, urine retention, stress, shock, psychological trauma, and damage to
the urethra and anus.'" Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634, 638 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing In re
Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 361 (BIA 1996)).
2 U.S.
Department of Justice Immigration and Naturalization Service,
Guidelines for Children's Asylum Claims (Dec. 10, 1998), available at
http://www.asy lumlaw .0rgJdocslunited_states/guidelineslchildren. pdf.
3 Under U.S. immigration law, asylum may be granted to a non-citizen who
meets the statutory defmition of a refugee and is physically within the United States.
8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42) (West 2009). The definition of "refugee" provided by the
Immigration and Nationality Act is:
The term "refugee" means (A) any person who is outside any country of such
person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside
any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or
unwilling to return to, and is unable and unwilling to avail himself or herself of
the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion ....

Id
The only difference between a refugee and an asylee is that a refugee is in
another country seeking refuge and an asylum seeker has already arrived in
the United States. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(a)(1) (West 2009). An alien can also
apply for withholding of removal. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1231(b)(2) (West 2009).
Withholding of removal is a narrower remedy that prohibits forcible return of
the alien to the country of persecution but not to third countries. An
application for asylum under § 1158 is automatically treated as an
application for withholding of removal under § 1231(b)(2) in the event relief
under § 1158 is denied. 8 C.F.R. § 208.3(b) (West 2009).
• 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(b)(3)(A) (West 2009) ("In general ... la] spouse or child ...
of an alien who is granted asylum under this subsection may, if not otherwise eligible
for asylum under this section, be granted the same status as the alien if accompanying,
or following to join, such alien."); see also Kimberly Sowders Blizzard, A Parent's
Predicament: Theories of Relief for Deportable Parents of Children ~o Face Female
Genital Mutilation, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 899, 900 (2006) (noting the difficult choice a
parent faces when his/her daughter would be exposed to FGM in the parents' home
country because United States courts either refuse to or cannot find legal authority to
allow the parents to remain in the United States); Alida Yvonne Lasker, Solomon's
Choice: The Case for Granting Derivative Asylum to Parents, 32 BROOK. J. INT'L. L.
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Children frequently face de facto deportation when their
parents do not have a legal right to remain in the United
States. 5 De facto deportation occurs when a child is not legally
deemed deportable but, realistically, the child has no choice but
to leave the United States along with her parene The child is
likely to return to the parent's home country because of a lack
of family ties and support in the United States. 7 De facto
deportation often arises in two situations. The first situation is
the case of an asylee childs for whom a grant of asylum may
represent an empty promise of protection if the family would
have to, or likely choose to, take the child to the home country
in order to keep the family intact. 9 The second situation is the
case of a U.s. citizen or legal permanent resident (LPR) child
who, despite having a legal right to remain in the United
States, would nevertheless be subject to de facto deportation to
a country where the child would likely suffer persecution. 10
Current asylum law fails to put proper emphasis on
protecting the child. The ''best interest of the child" principle
was specifically addressed in a memorandum from the legacy
INS (Immigration and Naturalization Service), now known as
231 (2006).
5 The term "de facto" refers to something that is actual and existing in fact. De
facto deportation of a child would occur should a parent not be granted asylum relief as
the child would certainly return with her parent to their home country as the parent
would be unable to legally remain in the United States. Although the child is not
formally or legally being deported, the reality of the situation is that she too would
leave the country with her parent.
6 The reference to "her" in this sentence should be understood to mean both his
and her. Throughout this Comment, references to individuals will be in the feminine
form in order to maintain readability and uniformity. In no way does a reference in the
feminine form mean to exclude its applicability to males as well.
7 See In re Dibba, No. A73 541 857 (BIA Nov. 23, 2001) ("[Nlormally a mother
would not be expected to leave her child in the United States in order to avoid
persecution.").
8 This Comment refers to both "refugees" and "asylees." Although the terms are
used interchangeably to mean children who suffered past persecution or have a wellfounded fear of future persecution, it is important to understand the distinction. An
"asylee" is an individual who is inside the U.S. and claiming asylum relief. A "refugee"
is a person who is outside the U.S. and requesting asylum in the U.S. See DEBORAH E.
ANKER, LAw OF AsYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (Paul T. Lufkin ed., Refugee Law
Center 1999).
9 See Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634 (6th Cir. 2004) (dealing with alien
children).
10 See Abebe v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2005) (dealing with U.S. citizen
children); Olowo v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 692 (7th Cir. 2004) (dealing with U.S. citizen
children).
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the Department of Homeland Security, which recognized the
increasing attention from the international community toward
children asylum seekers. l l Given the legacy INS's stance on
protecting the best interest of the child, the current practice in
the United States runs counter to national and international
concerns about providing relief for parents of asylee children.
In addition, while the child would be subject to potential
persecution should she return to her home country with a
parent, should she remain in the United States she would
instead be torn from her family. Such separation of parent and
child runs contrary to the "time-honored policy of family unity
in U.S. law.,,12
This Comment focuses on the need for statutory change in
order to address the policy concerns of family unity and to
protect asylee children. Part I looks at how the current state of
immigration law stands in relation to derivative asylum claims.
Part II examines how courts have interpreted current asylum
law and the inconsistency and shortcomings of such judicial
interpretations. Part III examines policy concerns associated
with the child-parent derivative asylum issue, specifically
family unity and practical child protection. Finally, Part IV
makes two recommendations: 1) legislative change to current
asylum law to allow derivative relief for parents of asylee
children, and 2) a request for affirmative guidance from the
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) on asylum eligibility
standards for parents of U.S. citizen and LPR children who fear
persecution in their parents' home country.

11 u.s.
Department of Justice Immigration and Naturalization Service,
Guidelines for Children's Asylum Claims (Dec. 10, 1998), available at
http://www.asylumlaw.orgJdocslunited_states/guidelineslchildren.pdf (stating that the
internationally recognized "best interests of the child" principle is a useful measure for
determining appropriate procedures when dealing with children, even though it does
not playa role in determining substantive eligibility under the U.S. refugee definition.
The principle rests on the idea that children's rights are human rights and universal
rights and focuses on the vulnerability of children and the need for refugee policies to
protect and assist them).
12 Marcelle Rice, Protecting Parents:
Why Mothers and Fathers Who Oppose
Female Genital Cutting QualifY for Asylum, Immigration Briefings (Nov. 2004).
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DERIVATIVE ASYLUM: ELIGIBILITY UNDER EXISTING U.S.
IMMIGRATION LAW

Section 208 of the Immigration Nationality Act (INA)13
provides that, once an individual is granted asylum/ 4
derivative claims can be asserted by the primary applicant's
spouse and/or minor child, whether or not the spouse or child
independently meets the requirements for asylum. 1s However,
the statute is silent in regard to parents. 16 This poses an
exceptional problem for asylum seekers when the principal
asylum applicant is a child.
Since parents of children granted asylum are not granted
derivative eligibility under the INA,17 they must look to other
avenues of relief in order to remain legally in the United
States. However, there are few alternatives available. In order
to establish an independent claim for asylum relief, a parent
must show that she meets the definition of refugee pursuant to
§ 1l01(a)(42).IB
The parent must prove either actual
persecution or a "well-founded fear of persecution" by the
government of the home country or a group the government

13 The INA, the governing statute for United States immigration law, was
enacted in 1952. Before the INA, a variety of statutes governed immigration law;
however, they lacked effective organization. The refugee and asylum provisions were
added by the Refugee Act of 1980. The INA is currently codified at 8 u.s.c. §1101 et
seq.
14 The INA states that any alien who is physically present in the United States
or who arrives in the United States may apply for asylum in accordance with INA §
208. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158 (West 2009). A person seeking asylum must have a "wellfounded fear" that he or she will suffer persecution on account of "race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." In reAcosta,
19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 213 (1985) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A».
15 "A spouse or child (as defmed in [INA] § 101(b)(1)(A), (B), (C), (D), or (E» of an
alien who is granted asylum under this subsection may, if not otherwise eligible for
asylum under this section, be granted the same status as the alien if accompanying, or
following to join, such alien." 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(b)(3) (West 2009).
16 For immigration purposes, "child" is defined as an unmarried person under
twenty-one years of age who is a child born in wedlock, a stepchild, legitimized, born
out of wedlock, adopted, or classified as an immediate relative under 8 U.S.C.A. §
1151(b). 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(b)(1) (West 2009).
17 The statute specifically provides derivative claims for spouses and children of
the principal applicant, but it makes no mention of parents of principal applicants,
even when the principal applicant is a minor child. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(b)(3) (West
2009).
18 8 U.S.C.A. § 1l01(a)(42) (West 2009). Those applying for asylum have to do so
within one year of arriving in the United States. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(a)(2)(C) (West
2009).
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cannot or will not control making the parent unable or
unwilling to "avail himself or herself of the persecution.,,19 The
persecution or well-founded fear of persecution must be based
on one of the following five categories:
race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion. 20
Although one may be able to establish past persecution, or
a well-founded fear of future persecution, it is generally
difficult to establish a nexus between the persecution and one
ofthe five protected categories. 21 This is especially true when it
is a parent basing an asylum claim on a child's fear of
persecution. 22 A few courts of appeals have shaped the
definition of membership in a particular social group to provide
relief to parents and protection to children. 23 However, these
holdings are limited and not consistent among the circuits,
thus not providing adequate protection to all children. 24
Furthermore, outside the asylum context, three categories
exist for granting legal immigrant status: family relationship,26

8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42) (West 2009).
Id.
21 See Center for Gender and Refugees Studies, CGRS Advice - Female Genital
Cutting
Asylum
Cases
(Oct.
2007),
available
at
http://cgrs. uchastings.eduldocumentslcgrsladvisorieslFGC_cases_CG RS_overview_advi
ce.pdf.
22
Id.
23 See, e.g., Abebe v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc); Abay v.
Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634 (6th Cir. 2004).
24
Id
25 8 U.S.C.A. § 1153 (West 2009).
Parents of children who qualify for asylum
relief, but who do not themselves independently qualify for asylum relief, are faced
with further disappointment as they are unlikely to gain relief under a "family
sponsored imInigrant" category. There are four preference categories for family
sponsored imInigrants: unmarried sons and daughters of citizens, spouses and
unmarried sons and unmarried sons and unmarried daughters of permanent resident
aliens, married sons and married daughters of permanent resident aliens, and brothers
and sisters of citizens. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1153(a) (West 2009). In addition, spouses and
Ininor children of U.S. citizens are "immediate relatives" outside the preference system.
8 U.S.C.A. § 1151(b)(E)(2)(A)(i) (West 2009). Parents of a U.S. citizen may also be
immediate relatives entitled to be petitioned by their son or daughter, but only after
the U.S. citizen child reaches the age of twenty-one. An individual granted asylum
whose adInission has not been terminated and who has been physically present in the
United States for at least one year may apply to adjust his or her status to that of an
LPR. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1159(a) (West 2009). Upon maintaining five years of LPR status,
the individual is then entitled to apply for naturalization in order to gain U.S.
citizenship. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1427(a) (West 2009).
19

20
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employment-based, and diversity immigrant status. 26 As to
family relationship, there are four family preference categories,
none of which allows a child, defined as an unmarried person
under twenty-one years of age,27 to petition for a parent. 28 Since
it is unrealistic for a minor child to remain unaccompanied in
the United States, a child asylee whose parents do not qualify
for asylum or other immigration benefits almost certainly ends
up leaving the United States with her parents and returning to
their home country, where they face persecution. 29
II. DEALING WITH THE SHORTCOMINGS: CONFLICTING COURT
OF APPEALS APPROACHES TO PARENTAL AsYLUM
ELIGIBILITY

Since the INA does not expressly provide any relief for
parents of asylee children, the BIA and the courts of appeals
have developed various interpretations to afford relief 30 and
26 Both employment-based and diversity immigrant status categories
are
complex processes that are often beyond the reach of parents of asylee children and are
beyond the scope ofthis Comment.
27
8 U.S.C.A. § 1151(b) (West 2009).
28 8 U.S.C.A. § 1153(a) (West 2009). A United States citizen under the age of
twenty-one cannot confer legal status on his or her parents, nor can a LPR of any age.
In addition, should the child become a U.S. citizen after five years of LPR status, the
child would have to wait until they reached the age of twenty-one in order to petition
for the parents to be granted the legal right to relocate to the United States as
immediate relatives. Thus, even if a child is able to petition for a parent under one of
the family-sponsored immigrant preference categories, she would still face being
separated from her parent for up to six years, plus the time it takes to reach the age of
twenty-one, as the child would need to gain LPR status and subsequently U.S.
citi2enship in order to petition for a family relative. The more tender-aged and
vulnerable the asylee child, the longer she must wait to be joined with her parents.
See generally Andres v. Holder, 312 F. App'x 905, 2009 WL 430437 (9th Cir. 2009)
(addressing the issue of children of tender years but in the context of when a child
witnesses a parent's persecution); Hernandez-Andres v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 1042 (9th
Cir.2007).
29 Alida Yvonne Lasker, Solomon's Choice: The Case for Granting Derivative
Asylum to Parents, 32 BROOK. J. lNT'L. L. 231, 253 (2006).
30 Congress's enactment of the megal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (§ 601(a» provided an addition to the term "refugee" for
immigration purposes. The Act added a sentence to the end of 8 U.S.C.A. § 1l01(a)(42)
that reads as follows:

For purposes of determinations under this chapter, a person who has been forced
to abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary sterilization, or who has been
persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo such a procedure or for other
resistance to a coercive population control program, shall be deemed to have
been persecuted on account of political opinion, and a person who has a well
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looked to alternative legal strategies31 in order to protect
children. Unfortunately, this piecemeal system has resulted in
contradictory approaches among the circuits as to a parent's
asylum eligibility in such circumstances. 32 Circuits are in
conflict over whether a child's fear of persecution can establish
eligibility for a parent's asylum claim. This is particularly true
in cases dealing with FGM; as the practice is directed mainly at
children, parents are unable to claim direct persecution. 33
Courts of appeals are bound by long-standing U.S. Supreme
Court precedent to defer to a reasonable BIA administrative
interpretation of the INA statute. 34 But the BIA, as well as
immigration courts, fails to provide concrete guidance
regarding whether a parent qualifies for asylum relief when
her child would be subjected to persecution were they to return
to their home country.3S The BIA has not yet directly addressed
the parent-child derivative issue. In fact, in Benyamin v.
founded fear that he or she will be forced to undergo such a procedure or subject
to persecution for such failure, refUsal, or resistance shall be deemed to have a
well founded fear of persecution on account of political opinion.
8 U.S.C.A. § 1l01(a)(42) (West 2009) (emphasis added).
The BIA then interpreted this new language to apply to spouses of
individuals who have been forced to abort pregnancy or undergo involuntary
sterilization or who have been or fear they will be persecuted for failure to
undergo abortion or sterilization procedures, if the spouse can show eligibility
based on her experience or fears. See In re J-S, 24 I. & N. Dec. 520, 542 (BIA
2008) (overruling the decisions in In re C-Y-Z, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915 (BIA 1997);
In re S-L-L, 24 I. & N. Dec. 1 (BIA 2006) (rejecting the per-se joint spousal,
eligibility rule, and finding that a spouse of an individual who suffered or will
suffer abortion or sterilization can qualify for asylum based on her fears and
experiences with coercive family-planning policies).
31 See Tchoukhrova v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding
that the applicant established an asylum claim based on the harm suffered by her
disabled child by inventing the doctrine of "persecution renvoi," which establishes that
a parent may file as the principal applicant and use the harms suffered by the child to
support the parent's claim).
32 Compare Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634, 642 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding mother
eligible for asylum), with In re A-K-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 275, 277 (BIA 2007) (holding
mother ineligible on ground she could choose to leave her U.S. citizen child behind in
the United States), andOlowo v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding mother
ineligible).
33 See BenyanIin v. Holder, 579 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 2009); Abay v. Ashcroft, 368
F.3d 634 (6th Cir. 2004); Olowo v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 692 (7th Cir. 2004) .
.. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837,844 (1984).
35 Wes Henricksen, Abay v. Ashcroft: The Sixth Circuit's Baseless Expansion of
INA § 101(a)(42)(a) Revealed a Gap in Asylum Law, 80 WASH. L. REV. 477, 490-91
(referring to BIA decisions In re Oluloro, In re Adeniji, and In re Dibba).
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Holder,36 the Ninth Circuit specifically remanded the case to
the BIA to consider whether a respondent derivatively qualifies
based on the persecution suffered by the child. However, the
BIA has yet to address this question.
In their attempt to resolve the parent-child derivative
issue, the courts of appeals have provided three methods of
relief, none of which is specifically prescribed by statute. These
include 1) basing the claim on the psychological harm a parent
would suffer from witnessing her child's persecution,37 2)
establishing relief under the theory of constructive
deportation,3S and 3) granting eligibility based on the
persecution a parent would directly face for attempting to
protect her child. 39 While demonstrating the courts' valiant
efforts, these methods have unfortunately failed to put proper
emphasis on protecting the child. 40
A.

ESTABLISHING AN INDEPENDENT AsYLUM CLAIM:
IMPUTING A CHILD'S FEAR TO A PARENT

The legal strategy of imputing the child's fear of
persecution to her parent does not establish the parent as a
derivative asylum applicant. Rather, it provides the parent
with an independent ground for asylum eligibility. The Sixth

Benyamin, 579 F.3d 970.
See Abay, 368 F.3d at 642.
3B See, e.g., Benyamin, 579 F.3d at 974; Olowo, 368 F.3d at 701; Oforji v.
Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609, 616 (7th Cir. 2003).
39 See Abebe, 432 F .3d at 1043. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case back to
the BIA and the BIA remanded the case to the Immigration Court of Portland, Oregon.
The immigration judge held that the parent would face extreme harassment, threats,
possible physical violence, ostracism, discrimination, and severe economic deprivation
in preventing daughter's FGM, which provided grounds for parent's asylum claim. Id.
See In re Anon (A# redacted) (Portland, Or., Immigration Court, Dec. 19, 2007) (on file
with the Center for Gender & Refugee Studies, Univ. of Cal., Hastings); Abay, 368 F.3d
at 640 (holding that ostracism may be type of persecution); Persecution of Family
Members, Memorandum from the Office of International Affairs, Asylum Division,
June 30, 1997, at 1 ("harm to an applicant's family member may constitute persecution
to the applicant."); In re Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec. 16 (BIA 1989) (where the BIA granted
humanitarian asylum based in part on past harm to the applicant's father); see
generally Kimberly Sowders Blizzard, A Parent's Predicament: Theories of Relief for
Deportable Parents of Children U710 Face Female Genital Mutilation, 91 CORNELL L.
REV. 899, 904 (2006) (discussing theories for relief for parents whose children face
FGM).
40 Alida Yvonne Lasker, Solomon's Choice: The Case for Granting Derivative
Asylum to Parents, 32 BROOK. J. INT'L. L. 231, 253 (2006).
36

37
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Circuit addressed this issue in Abay v. Ashcroft. 41 There, a
mother petitioned for asylum relief on the basis of her minor
daughter's fear of FGM in their native country of Ethiopia. 42
The issue before the court was whether the mother could "seek
asylum in her own right based on a fear that her child" would
be subjected to FGM. 43 The mother acknowledged that she did
not have an express statutory right to derivative asylum based
on her child's asylee status, but instead posited that she was
eligible in her own right based on her fear that her daughter
would be persecuted. 44 The Sixth Circuit recognized that a
parent is independently eligible for asylum if the parent can
show a "well-founded fear" of the persecution of a family
member. 45 However, the Sixth Circuit declined to address
whether parents are eligible for derivative status. 46 Instead,
the court found that a parent's fear of being unable to preventas well as having to witness - her child's mutilation constituted
persecution. 47 The Abay court granted the mother asylum
relief, hol!iing that the type of psychological persecution she
feared was legitimate and made asylum relief appropriate. 48
It has been argued that Abay resolves the child-parent
derivative asylum issue and should be adopted by other circuits
and the BIA. 49 However, the circuits remain divided on what
constitutes persecution. Thus, the Abay decision does not
guarantee that in every instance of child asylum eligibility, the
child's parent will be granted asylum relief. 50
Abay, 368 F.3d at 642.
Id. at 640-41.
43 Id
44
Id
45 Id at 642.
46 Id. at 641.
47 Id. at 642.
48 Id at 641-42.
49 See Marcelle Rice, Protecting Parents: ~y Mothers and Fathers ~o Oppose
Female Genital Cutting QuaJifjr for Asylum, Immigration Briefings (Nov. 2004).
50 See DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF AsYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 171 (Paul T.
Lufkin ed., Refugee Law Center 1999) (quoting United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status §51
(1988». Compare Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 961 (9th Cir. 1996) (defining persecution
as the "infliction of suffering or harm upon those who differ ... in a way regarded as
offensive"), with Xie v. INS, 434 F.3d, 136, 143 (2d Cir. 2006). See also Alida Yvonne
Lasker, Solomon's Choice: The Case for Granting Derivative Asylum to Parents, 32
BROOK. J. lNT'L. L. 231, 253 (2006) ("Abay theory fails to put proper emphasis on the
child, and as a result, may fail to protect the child.").
41

42
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Other circuits are unlikely to follow the reasoning set out
in Abay because their definitions of persecution do not extend
to mental or psychological harm. 51 In addition, the Abay
analysis fails to properly consider the best interests of the
child. Under the Abayapproach, if a parent cannot show that
the mental harm she would suffer amounts to persecution, the
parent still must decide whether to abandon her child or take
her to a country in which the child would be subject to
persecution. 52 Although an asylum application is generally
based on the individual applicant, the unique parent-child
relationship means that a decision not to provide relief to the
parent directly affects the child, who would consequently face
de facto deportation. Therefore, it is necessary to provide relief
to parents that also takes into account the best interest of the
child.
The BIA has also identified two additional considerations
in determining whether an individual is a member of a
particular social group: particularity and social visibility of the
social groUp.53 In Abay, the particular social group consisted of
mothers who are unable to prevent their daughters from being
subjected to FGM and who thus fear experiencing their
daughters' FGM. 54 Focusing on the psychological harm to the
parent, under Abay, a parent whose child fears persecution in
the parent's home country may automatically meet the wellfounded fear of persecution requirement. The court in Abay
concluded that the mother there met the definition of refugee
based on her fear of being unable to prevent her daughter's
subjection to FGM and her fear of experiencing the cutting of
her daughter's genitalia.
Consequently, the Abay court
reversed the BIA's decision that the mother was ineligible for
asylum relief.
The primary problem with asserting an independent
asylum claim on behalf of the parent based on future
51 See Niang v.
Gonzales, 492 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that
psychological harm without accompanying physical harm is not enough to establish
persecution).
52 Alida Yvonne Lasker, Solomon's Choice: The Case for Granting Derivative
Asylum to Parents, 32 BROOK J.lNT'L. L. 231,253 (2006).
53 See In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 959 (BIA 2006) (explaining that a
particular social group needs to be socially visible); In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579,
584 (BIA 2008) (explaining that a particular social group also needs be sufficiently
particular).
54 Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634, 642 (6th Cir. 2004).
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psychological harm is establishing a "nexus" between the
psychological harm and a protected groUp.55 In a child asylum
case, particularly an FGM case, the child is generally claiming
persecution due to her membership in a particular social
group. 56 The immutable characteristics that define the group
must be unchangeable or so fundamental to the individual's
identity that she should not be forced to change. 57 However,
the group cannot be significantly defined solely by the
persecution suffered or feared. 58 A parent claiming asylum
based on a child's fear of persecution would have particular
difficulty since not all circuits recognize psychological harm as
persecution. In addition, even if the court recognizes such a
form of persecution, the parent must establish that the
psychological harm suffered or feared is the direct result of her
membership in a particular social group, something that is
exceptionally difficult given the strict restrictions on the
definition of a "social group."
The Sixth Circuit has specifically recognized a particular
social group, allowing asylum protection to parents based on
the psychological fear of the persecution of their children.
However, parents of claimants applying for asylum outside the
Sixth Circuit may be unable to establish an asylum claim
independent of the persecution a child fears if they are unable
to prove the persecution is due to one of the five protected
. 59
cat egones.

55 Under the "nexus" requirement, an individual's fear of persecution needs to be
reasonably related to her race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1l01(a)(42) (West 2009).
56 See In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 357 (BIA 1996) (defIning the particular
social group as "[yJoung women who are members of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe of
northern Togo who have not been subjected to female genital mutilation, as practiced
by that tribe, and who oppose the practice").
57 See In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 958 (BIA 2006); Center for Gender and
Refugees Studies, CGRS Advice - Female Genital Cutting Asylum Cases (Oct. 2007)
(stating that "victims of female genital cutting" is an improper way to defIne a social
available
at
group),
http://cgrs. uchastings.edu/documents/cgrs/advisoriesIFGC_cases_CG RS_overview_advi
ce.pdf.
58 Center for Gender and Refugees Studies, CGRS Advice - Female Genital
Cutting Asylum Cases (Oct. 2007) (stating that "victims of female genital cutting" is an
improper
way
to
defIne
a
social
group),
available
at
http://cgrs. uchastings.edu/documents/cgrs/advisoriesIFGC_cases_CGRS_overview_advi
ce.pdf.
59 Id.
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AN ALTERNATIVE AVENUE: THE CONSTRUCTIVE
DEPORTATION THEORY

In order to better protect the interests of children, courts of
appeals have turned to other means of granting relief to
parents of asylee children. 60 In Benyamin v. Holder, a father
applied for asylum relief on the grounds that his minor
daughter had faced past persecution in the form of FGM in
Indonesia and that he feared his other daughter would be
subjected to FGM should the family return to Indonesia. 61 The
Ninth Circuit recognized that the father's application for
asylum raised a "unique concern - the effect that the BIA's
decision to deny relief to Benyamin [would] have on his alien
minor children.,,62 The court then held that the father's asylum
application raised the issue of constructive deportation of his
daughters. 63 Citing the court's earlier decision in Abebe v.
Gonzales, the court reasoned that, "[b]ecause a minor alien has
no legal right to remain in the United States, 'deportation of
[her] parents would result in [her] being constructively
deported."'64 However, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case
back to the BIA to consider the daughter's persecution in its
own right as a potential ground for granting relief to the father,
thus declining to extend the theory of constructive
deportation. 65
Likewise, the Seventh Circuit considered the constructive
deportation theory in addressing the problems associated with
children returning to a country in which they fear
persecution. 66 In Oforji v. Ashcroft, the Seventh Circuit held
that a claim for parental asylum basing eligibility on the
potential harm to the applicant's child is cognizable only when
the applicant's child is subject to "constructive deportation"
60 See Benyamin v. Holder, 579 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (remanding case to BIA
to consider whether respondent derivatively qualifies based on the persecution suffered
by the child).
61 Id. at 972.
62 Id. at 974.
63 Id. (quoting Abebe v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 1037, 1048-49 (9th Cir. 2005) (en
banc) (Tallman, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part».
64 Id. at 974.
65 Id. at 978.
660forji v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609, 618 (7th Cir. 2003) (fmding constructive
deportation theory did not support respondent's claim for withholding of removal under
the United Nations Convention Against Torture).
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along with the applicant. 67 However, under Seventh Circuit
precedent, a child is deemed to be "constructively deported"
only if she has no other legal right to remain in the United
States. 68 In OfOzjl: the mother asserted relief based on the
FGM her two U.S. citizen daughters would face should she be
forced to relocate her family to Nigeria. 69 The Seventh Circuit,
applying the constructive deportation doctrine, reaffirmed the
BIA's denial of asylum relief, holding that the mother failed to
show that the daughters would be constructively deported,
given their legal right to remain in the United States as
citizens.
The Seventh Circuit also addressed the theory of
constructive deportation in Olowo v. Ashcroft. 7o In Olowo, both
of Ms. Olowo's daughters feared FGM persecution in their
mother's home country.71 The court noted that, not only were
both daughters legal permanent residents of the United States,
but so was their father. Consequently, the court recognized
that more than just the status of the child is relevant in
determining whether the constructive deportation theory
applies. 72 The court held that, since there was a parent
available to care for the daughters in the United States, and
since the daughters themselves also had a legal right to remain
in the country, they were under no compulsion to leave and
would not be constructively deported. 73
The result of the varied appellate decisions is that "[t]he
constructive deportation doctrine thus offers very narrow
protection to parents of alien children, applying only if the
alien child does not have the option to stay in the United
States.,,74 However, in the FGM context, "because an alien
Id. at 615-16.
Id. at 616.
69 Id. at 612.
70 Olowo v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 692, 701 (7th Cir. 2004).
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
The argument could be made that the father could then petition for the
spouse as an immediate relative, thus providing relief for the mother who would
otherwise not have a legal right to remain in the United States. However, this
argument fails to take into account the fact that the mother and father of the children
never were married, which entirely eliminates that avenue of relief for the mother.
7. Kimberly Sowders Blizzard, A Parent's Predicament: Theories of Relief for
Deportable Parents of Children U710 Face Female Genital Mutilation, 91 CORNELL L.
REV. 899, 900 (2006).
67

68
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child facing FGM if her parents are deported would most likely
qualify for asylum herself, it would be a rare case in which the
constructive deportation doctrine would save a parent from the
predicament of deserting the child or exposing her to the risk of
FGM.,,75 The only way to get around this limitation is to have
the parent, rather than the child, apply for asylum relief based
on the parent's fear of the child's persecution. By adopting this
legal strategy, the child will not have established a legal right
to remain in the United States and the parent can thus claim
constructive deportation of the child as a means of relief.
However, such a complicated legal strategy is likely to be
impractical and inaccessible for most of those who flee to the
United States in the hope of obtaining asylum relief.
Furthermore, since the theory of constructive deportation
would not apply to children who can legally remain in the
United States, yet would still result in the deportation of the
child's parent, the theory of constructive deportation ultimately
fails to provide adequate protection to qualifying children.
C.

ATTEMPTS To PROTECT U.S. CITIZEN AND LPR CHILDREN:
ESTABLISHING A "WELL-FOUNDED FEAR" BASED ON
PERSECUTION FOR PROTECTING A CHILD

Although children who have a legal right to remain in the
United States do not fall under the constructive deportation
theory, the reality is that such children nevertheless face de
facto deportation when their parents are deemed ineligible for
asylum relief. 76 Unlike constructive deportation, de facto
deportation is not premised on an imputed legal effect, but
instead is based on fact and reality. Regardless of whether a
child has a legal right to remain in the United States, when a
parent is not granted relief and is subsequently ordered
removed, the child will most likely accompany the parent to a
country in which the child fears persecution. Therefore, it is
necessary that U.S. asylum law take into account the threat de
facto deportation poses for children, particularly U.S. citizen
and LPR children.
75

Id
The term "constructive" refers to something that is legally imputed or has an
effect in law though not necessarily in fact. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 138 (West 2001).
The term "de facto" refers to something that is actual and existing in fact that has
effect even though not formally or legally recognized. Id. at 187.
76
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The Ninth Circuit in Abebe v. Gonzales recognized the
need to protect U.S. citizen children who would be forced to
leave the country with parents who could not qualify for
asylum.77 In Abebe, a mother and father were claiming asylum
based on the persecution their U.S. citizen daughter would face
if the parents were forced to relocate their family to Ethiopia. 78
The Ninth Circuit found that there was sufficient evidence to
show that the threat of FGM of the daughter exceeded the
threshold required to establish asylum eligibility.79 Therefore,
the court remanded the case to the BIA to address whether
parents of a U.S. citizen child who are likely to face persecution
in the parents' home country qualify for asylum relief. 80 The
BIA then remanded the case to the immigration judge, who
concluded that a parent could establish a well-founded fear of
persecution based on the harm she could suffer from
attempting to protect her U.S. citizen child from persecution. 81
Although noting that mere discrimination is generally not
enough,82 the immigration judge held that discrimination in
combination with other harms may be sufficient to establish
persecution. 83 The judge found that the child's parents would
face extreme harassment, threats, possible physical violence,
ostracism, discrimination, and severe economic deprivation

77 Abebe v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 1037, 1043 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Ninth
Circuit remanded the case back to the BIA, which remanded to the Immigration Court
of Portland, Or.). The facts and holding pertaining to the extent of persecution the
parent would face in attempting to protect the child from persecution were provided in
the unpublished decision of the immigration judge. In reAnon (A# redacted) (Portland,
Or., Immigration Court, Dec. 19, 2007) (on file with the Center for Gender & Refugee
Studies, Univ. of Cal., Hastings).
78 Abebe, 432 F.3d at 1043.
79 Id.
80 Id.

81 In re Anon (A# redacted) (Portland, Or., Immigration Court, Dec. 19, 2007) (on
file with the Center for Gender & Refugee Studies, Univ. of Cal., Hastings) (addressing
issue of whether a parent of a U.S. citizen child likely to face persecution in the
parent's home country is eligible for asylum that was remanded in Abebe to the BIA
and then to the IJ).
82 Id. (citing Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955,962 (9th Cir. 1996».
83 In re Anon (A# redacted) (Portland, Or., Immigration Court, Dec. 19, 2007) (on
file with the Center for Gender & Refugee Studies, Univ. of Cal., Hastings) (citing
Krotova v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding anti-Semitic
harassment, sustained economic and social discrimination, and violence against
Russian Jew and her family compelled finding of persecution) and Korablina v. INS,
158 F.3d 1038, 1044-45 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding discrimination, harassment, and
violence against Ukranian Jew can constitute persecution».
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should they attempt to prevent their daughter from undergoing
FGM. 84 The judge also found that the child's parents had
established the existence of a practice of persecution in
Ethiopia against families who would not allow their daughters
to undergo FGM. 85
Although the decision in Abebe attempts to provide
practical protection to U.S. citizen and LPR children who would
face persecution in their parents' home country, the analysis is
inconsistent with that of other the circuits and thus does not
provide practical protection to all children. In addition, the
decision in Abebe highlights the inherent limitation of the
remedy, since the court focuses primarily on the parent
neglecting to take into account the harms that the child would
face, given the unique circumstances of the parent-child
relationship. Furthermore, although the decision in Abebe
provides relief, it is extremely limited because it is binding law
only within the Ninth Circuit.
As illustrated by Abay, Benyamin, and Abebe, there are
serious pitfalls in a system that attempts to resolve the childparent asylum issue entirely through
adjudicative
interpretation of current asylum law. It is unclear whether the
Supreme Court will ever intervene to resolve the conflicts
associated with the child-parent derivative asylum issue.
Moreover, even if the Supreme Court does weigh in, it is not
apparent that any resolution under the current statutes could
provide comprehensive protection for refugee children. As a
result, it is necessary to look to legislative changes in order to
provide for the practical protection of children who would suffer
persecution should their parents not be granted asylum relief.
III. POLICY CONCERNS FAVORING LEGISLATIVE CHANGE:
FAMILY UNITY AND PROVIDING PRACTICAL PROTECTION FOR
CHILD REFUGEES
To inform the discussion of legislative change to existing
asylum law, it is first necessary to examine the policy concerns
that favor a legislative resolution. Current U.S. immigration
law regarding the child-parent derivative issue runs contrary

84 In reAnon (A# redacted) (Portland, Or., Immigration Court, Dec. 19,2007) (on
file with the Center for Gender & Refugee Studies, Univ. of Cal., Hastings).
85 d.
I
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to the principles of family unity and the protection of child
refugees. When a child remains in the United States without
her parents or accompanies her parents outside the United
States, the child is not being protected.
A.

FAMILY UNITY

The parent's option of leaving a child behind in the United
States unaccompanied runs contrary to the goals of
immigration law and conflicts with a body of constitutional and
international human-rights laws aimed at protecting family
unity.86 In Stanley v. Illinois, the Supreme Court emphasized
the importance of family and the significance of keeping
families together. 87 Current immigration law regarding the
child-parent derivative asylum runs contrary to such
principles. A child who is granted asylum or who is a U.S.
citizen or LPR is forced to remain separated from her parent if
she wishes to stay in the United States and receive the benefits
associated with her legal status. 88
Although the word "family" is not specifically mentioned in
the United States Constitution, the Supreme Court has
consistently recognized the implicit value of family integrity
and extended a variety of powerful protections to the parentchild relationship.89 In doing so, the Court has stressed

86 One of immigration law's principal aims is to reunite families. This is clearly
illustrated by the availability of waivers of inadmissibility for "humanitarian purposes,
to assure family unity, or when it is otherwise in the public interest." 8 U.S.C.A. §
1255(h)(2)(B) (West 2009); see also The Universal Declaration of Human Rights Article
16(3) (1948), available at http://www.un.org/enldocuments/udhr ("The family is the
natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society
and the State.").
87 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
88 Should an asylee child leave, going back to the home country with her parent
could result in rescission of the child's asylum status because it would provide evidence
that the child was not "unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection
of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution ..." 8
U.S.CA § 1l01(a)(42)(A) (West 2009).
89 See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977) ("Our decisions
establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the
institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition. It is
through the family that we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished
values, moral and cultural."). The Supreme Court has also recognized among the
liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Constitution is the right of parents
to "establish a home and bring up children, [a right] essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men." Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
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parents' essential role in raising their children. 90 This includes
deciding where a child is domiciled, which is generally linked to
the domicile of the child's parents. 91 By placing primary
responsibility on the parent, the Court has strictly limited the
state's role in the family unit. 92 However, when it comes to
immigration law, the government plays a much more direct
role in deciding where a child and parent should live, making
the child's interest in an immigration context "much less
prominent."93
The direct role taken by the government in immigration
cases is illustrated in cases concerning child-parent derivative
asylum. By either granting or denying relief to the parent on
the basis of her child's fear of persecution, the courts ultimately
decide where the child will be domiciled. A parent who is not
granted asylum relief predicated on her child's fear of
persecution will either leave her child behind in the United
States or return her child to a country in which the child fears
persecution.
In the event a child who would otherwise face persecution
in her parent's home country remains behind in the United
States, conflicts with the principle of family integrity arise. 94 A
child has no right to confer legal status on her parent for
immigration purposes. 95 The parent must either leave the
United States or remain an undocumented immigrant, a
decision that has harsh ramifications. 96 This is a surprising
result, given that two high-priority important policy concerns
90 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (stating that it is "cardinal .
. . that the custody, care and nurture ofthe child reside fIrst in the parents").
91 Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. HolyfIeld, 490 U.S. 30, 48 (1989)
("Since most minors are legally incapable of forming the requisite intent to establish a
domicile, their domicile is determined by that of their parents.").
92 See Annette Ruth Appell, Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood, 34
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 683, 688 (2001) (speaking to the parameters set up by the
United States Constitution to limit the states' ability to defme and regulate family
rights and obligations).
93 David B. Thronson, Choiceless Choices:
Deportation and the Parent-Child
Relationship, 6 NEV. L.J. 1165, 1179 (2006).
94 [d.

95 In order to confer status an individual must be an LPR or U.S. citizen and
must be over the age of twenty-one. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1151(b)(1)(E)(2)(A)(i) (West 2009)
(dealing with immediate relatives); see also 8 U.S.C.A. § 1153(a) (West 2009) (dealing
with the four family-sponsored immigration preference categories).
96 8 U.S.C.A. §1182(a) (West 2009) (excludable aliens); 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229a(a)
(West 2009) (removal proceedings).
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of U.S. immigration law are family unity and the protection of
refugees. 97
B.

PRACTICAL PROTECTION FOR CHILDREN

Current immigration law not only raises policy concerns
about family unity, it also makes it difficult to provide practical
protection to an asylee, LPR, or U.S. citizen child. Policy issues
associated with providing meaningful protection to children
encompass general concerns about unaccompanied minors
living alone in the United States, a child's subjection to
persecution in her parents' home country, and the
psychological effects on a child of either remaining in the
United States or moving to her parents' home country.
Should a parent be denied asylum relief, resulting in a
child remaining alone in the United States, obvious policy
concerns arise. 98 There is a wealth of scholarship regarding
unaccompanied minors that provides insight into the shortfalls
of this aspect of our immigration system. 99 Reports of children
who remain behind in the United States without their parents
have shown that such circumstances lead to severe mental
trauma, negative changes in school performance, behavioral
problems, and feelings of abandonment and resentment
suffered by the children. 100
Children who remain
unaccompanied are likely to lack the emotional, financial and
psychological support needed to maintain stability and succeed
in life. lol
97 See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); see also OFFICE OF THE
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER OF REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND
CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS 43 (1992).
98 See generally Jacqueline Bhabha & Susan Schmidt, Seeking Asylum Alone:

Unaccompanied and Separated Children and Refugee Protection in the

u.s.,

THE

JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF CmLDHOOD AND YOUTH, VOL. 1, NO.1, 126-38 (2008).
99 See Jacqueline Bhabha, More Than Their Share of Sorrows: International
Migration Law and the Rights of Children, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PuB. L. REV. 253 (2003);
Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Unaccompanied RefUgee Minors: The Role and Place of
International Law in the Pursuit ofDurable Solutions, 3 INT'L J. CmLD. RTS. 405, 410
(1995); Ja:cqueline Bhabha & Wendy A. Young, Through a Child's Eyes: Protecting the
Most Vulnerable Asylum Seekers, 75 INTERPRETER RELEASES 757, 760 (1998).
100 See Nina Bernstein, A Mother Deported and a Child Left Behind, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 24, 2004, at Al (describing the accounts of several children who remained in the
United States after one or both of their parents were deported).
101 See Jacqueline Hagan, U.S. Deportation Policy, Family Separation, and
Circular Migration, 42 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 64 (2008) (providing a look into the
difficulties faced by families separated by removal).
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Furthermore, children who remain in the United States
without their parents and without alternative means of
support are immediately forced to tum to the government for
aid. 102 Separating the child and parent thus shifts the burden
of custody to the relevant state's foster-care system and
"ultimately onto the shoulders of American taxpayers.,,103 This
outcome "runs counter to international and domestic child
welfare principles regarding best interests of the child.,,104
In addition, studies have shown that children in the fostercare system are susceptible to emotional and behavioral
disturbances as well as developmental and mental-health
problems. 105 Children separated from their parents when
relocating to the United States are more prone to experience
difficulty in school and are more likely to be behind other
children their age in their educational development. l06 A child's
separation from her parents can also lead to negative
psychological effects for both the child and parent, with longterm separation commonly leading to severe depression and
. t y. 107
anxle
A parent who decides to remain in the United States with
her child but without valid immigration status becomes an
undocumented alien. lOS She would not be able to avail herself of

102 Center for Gender and Refugees Studies, CGRS Advice - Female Genital
Cutting
Asylum
Cases
(Oct.
2007),
available
at
http://cgrs. uchastings.edu/documents/cgrs/advisories/FGC_cases_CGRS_overview_advi
ce.pdf.
103 d.
I
104 d.
I
105 See June M. Clausen, Ph.D., John Landsverk, Ph.D., William Ganger, M.A.,
David Chadwick, M.D., & Alan Litrownik, Ph.D., Mental Health Problems of Children
in Foster Care, JOURNAL OF CmLD AND FAMILY STUDIES, VOL. 7, NO.3, 283-296 (Human
Sciences Press 1998); Hewitt B. Clark, Ph.D., Barbara Lee, Ph.D., Mark E. Prange,
Ph.D., & Beth A. McDonald, M.A., Children Lost Within the Foster Care System: Can
Wraparound Service Strategies Improve Placement Outcomes?, JOURNAL OF CmLD AND
FAMILY STUDIES, VOL. 5, NO.1, 39-54 (Human Sciences Press 1996).
106 T.H. Gindling & Susan Poggio, Family Separation and the Educational
Success ofImmigrant Children, Univ. of Md., Co. of Baltimore Brief No. 7 (Mar. 2009).
107 d.
I
108 If the parent has applied for asylum and been denied, she will automatically
be placed in removal proceedings. During removal proceedings she can reassert her
asylum claim. The issue of remaining undocumented arises when a parent has not
applied independently for asylum relief and been denied because, if she had applied,
she would be ordered removed from the United States. There are harsh ramifications
for individuals who remain undocumented in the United States, given the negative
sentiment toward undocumented aliens. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(c)(3) (West 2009).
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the benefits associated with residing in the United States
legally and she would live in fear of being arrested and forced
to leave. lo9 Should the parent remain in the United States
undocumented for more than one year, the parent would be
subject to a ten-year bar from re-entering the country. no The
parent would run the risk of being apprehended by
Immigration Customs Enforcement and ordered removed from
the United States. l l l Such risks result in extreme hardships to
the child forced either to flee with her parent or to remain
alone in the United States.ll2
In the alternative, in order to maintain family integrity, a
parent not eligible for asylum relief based on her child's fear of
persecution may choose to have the child accompany her back
to their home country. Although this would guarantee family
unity, it would subject the child to the very persecution that
established her as a refugee in the first place. In the case of a
country of origin that forces children to be subject to FGM, by
taking the child to the parent's home country, the parent would
subject the child to the threat of a practice recognized in the
United States as a crime, persecution, and torture. 113 Some
courts have even gone as far as to say that a parent who takes
a child back to such a home country may be putting her legal
custody of the child in jeopardy by endangering the child. 114 Yet
it is hardly reasonable to expect that a family will voluntarily
choose to break up the family unit and leave their asylee, U.S.
citizen, or LPR child outside the intimately protected circle of
her immediate relatives, even in order to protect the child from
possible persecution. Nor is it necessarily desirable from a
public policy standpoint to insist that families do so in order to
protect their children from persecution, when research shows
Id.
110 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) (West 2009). Should the parent remain in the
United States with her child for more than 180 days, the parent would be subject to a
three-year bar from entering the United States in the event she leaves the country and
attempts to return. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(l) (West 2009).
III 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i) (West 2009) (inadmissible and thus removable for
not being in possession of a valid entry document).
112 In removal proceedings the child could attempt to receive relief under
Cancellation "B" for non-LPRs ordered removed; however the standard of hardship is
exceptional-extremely unusual hardship-which is a very high standard to meet. See
8 U.S.C.A. § 1229b(b) (West 2009).
113 See In reKasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365 (BIA 1996).
114 See Olowo v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 692, 702-04 (7th Cir. 2004).
109
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that separation from primary caregivers is not in the best
interests of children. U5
Forcing a U.S. citizen or LPR child to relocate with her
parents amounts to a violation of the child's constitutionally
protected right to live in the United States. U6 The argument
has been made that a child who leaves for her parents' home
country can then make the choice to return to the United
States once she is older and thus not barred from enforcing a
protected right. 1l7 However, a child who leaves with her parent
to live in the parent's home country loses the benefits
associated with her legal status for the period of time during
which she lives outside the United States. us When the child is
an LPR, extensive periods outside the United States can
eventually lead to the presumption of abandonment of legal
resident status. U9
There are a variety of significant policy concerns directly
relevant to the parent-child derivative asylum issue. Children
who fear persecution in their home countries should be given
the right to confer legal status onto their parents. Such a right
would resolve the policy concerns of family unity and child
protection. Since both of these concerns are fundamental to the
life and future of the child, legislative attention to this issue is
both necessary and urgent.
115 See generally Nina Bernstein, A Mother Deported and a Child Left Behind,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2004, at Al (describing the accounts of several children who
remained in the United States after one or both of their parents were deported); June
M. Clausen, Ph.D., John Landsverk, Ph.D., William Ganger, M.A., David Chadwick,
M.D., & Alan Litrownik, Ph.D., Mental Health Problems of Children in Foster Care,
JOURNAL OF CHILD AND FAMILY STUDIES, VOL. 7, NO.3, 283-96 (Human Sciences Press
1998); Hewitt B. Clark, Ph.D., Barbara Lee, Ph.D., Mark E. Prange, Ph.D., & Beth A.
McDonald, M.A., Children Lost Within the Foster Care System: Can Wraparound
Service Strategies Improve Placement Outcomes?, JOURNAL OF CHILD AND FAMILY
STUDIES, VOL. 5, NO.1, 39-54 (Human Sciences Press 1996); T.H. Gindling & Susan
Poggio, Family Separation and the Educational Success of Immigrant Children, Univ.
of Md., Co. of Baltimore Brief No. 7 (Mar. 2009).
116 See Acosta v. Gaffney, 558 F.2d 1153 (3d Cir. 1977).
117 See Tischendorf v. Tischendorf, 321 N.W.2d 405 (Minn. 1982), cert. denied,
460 U.S. 1037 (1983) (noting that when a child objects to removal, the child's
constitutional right to remain in the country does not prevent the child's removal to a
foreign country by his custodial parent).
liB See generally Bill Piatt, Born as Second Class Citizens in the U.S.A.: Children
of Undocumented Parents, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 41 (1988).
119 A person might be found to have abandoned her status if she stays outside the
United States for more than 365 days without getting a re-entry permit before leaving.
See
U.S.
Dept.
of
State,
Returning
Resident
Alien,
http://travel.state.govlvisa/immigrantS/info/info_1333.html (last visited Mar. 17,2010).
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IV. NECESSARY CHANGE FOR CHILDREN: PROPOSED
LEGISLATION AND BIA ACTION

Given the policy concerns associated with parental
derivative asylum and the inconsistency at the adjudicative
level in allowing for asylum for parents of children who fear
persecution, change is necessary in order to protect children.
Change must come from both the legislature and the BIA in
order to provide practical protection to asylee, U.S. citizen, and
LPR children who fear persecution in their home countries.
Otherwise, these children will continue to be subjected to de
facto deportation and either separation from their parents or
the persecution that awaits them back home.

A. A NARROW SOLUTION: AMENDING THE DERIVATIVE
STATUTE

One way to address the policy concerns associated with the
parental derivative asylum issue is for Congress to amend 8
U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3) to include parents as derivatives of a child's
asylum application. 120 Such an amendment should establish a
derivative asylum right for parents of asylee children under the
age of twenty-one. The language of § 1158(b)(3)(A) should be
amended as follows:
A spouse, child (as defined in section llOl(b)(l) (A), (B), (C),
(D), or (E) of this title), or parent of an alien who is granted
asylum under this subsection may, if not otherwise eligible
for asylum under this section, be granted the same status as
the alien if accompanying, or following to join, such alien.

There will likely be criticisms of any such proposal to grant
derivative asylum to parents. l2l The fear of allowing a child to
confer legal status to her parents arises from worries about
increases in frivolous asylum claims. 122 In addition, it may be
argued that an unscrupulous parent might take advantage of

8 U.S.C.A. §1158(b)(3) (West 2009).
See generally The Federation for American Immigration Reform, Anchor
Babies:
Part
of
the
Immigration-Related
American
Lexicon,
http://www.fairus.orglsitelPageServer?pagename=iic_immigrationissuecenters4608
(last visited Mar. 17, 2010).
122 Id
120

121
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her child's asylum claim for personal benefit.123 Concededly,
this could be the case when a parent does not have a genuine
relationship with her child. Thus the parental derivative
asylum statute should be supplemented to include language
reqUInng the existence of a genuine parent-child
relationship.124 The proposed statutory language to supplement
§ 1158(b)(3) should read as follows:
A parent must show a bona fide parent-child relationship
with the child in order to qualify as a derivative asylee under
§ 1158(b)(3).125

Granting derivative asylum to parents will assure the
protection of refugee children. Such a statutory change is
feasible in the context of the very narrow slice of cases that
would actually fall under the parent-derivative statute. In
2008, of the 12,187 affirmative asylum grants, only 1,505 were
made to children under the age of seventeen. 126 This amounts
to approximately twelve percent of the total affirmative asylum
grants. 127 Of that twelve percent, it is highly unlikely that a110f
the children granted asylum had parents who wanted, but were
not eligible for, asylum relief. Therefore, it is doubtful that
providing derivative claims for parents will result in abuse or
outrageously high numbers of asylum claims on the basis of
parent-derivative eligibility.
123

Id

In the context of deriving status from a spouse, Congress responded to
concerns about whether the relationship was genuine and not merely for immigration
benefits by enacting legislation that deters individuals from filing claims based on a
fraudulent marriage. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1186a (West 2009).
125 Current law already defines a "bona fide parent-child relationship" as follows:
124

The terms 'parent', 'father', or 'mother' mean a parent, father, or mother only
where the relationship exists by reason of any of the circumstances set forth in
subdivision (1) of this subsection, except that, for purposes of paragraph (1)(F)
(other than the second proviso therein) in the case of a child born out of wedlock
described in paragraph (1)(D) (and not described in paragraph (1)(C», the term
'parent' does not include the natural father of the child if the father has
disappeared or abandoned or deserted the child or if the father has in writing
irrevocably released the child for emigration and adoption.
8 U.S.C.A. § 1l01(b)(2) (West 2009).
126 Daniel C. Martin & Michael Hoefer, Department of Homeland Security, Office
of Immigration Statistics, Annual Flow Report, Refugees and Asylees: 2008 (June
2009),
available
at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_rfa_fr_200B.pdf.
127 Id
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Statutory change of current U.S. immigration law is also
supported by expressed international views regarding parent
derivative asylum. The United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), the international authority on matters of
refugee law, expressed its position on derivative asylum claims
by stating that "family members/dependants of a recognized
refugee may apply for derivative refugee status in accordance
with their right to family unity."128 Unlike the United States,
the UNHCR considers spouses, unmarried children under the
age of eighteen, parents or primary caregivers of a principal
applicant who is under the age of eighteen, and minor siblings
of a principal applicant who is under the age of eighteen, as all
being eligible for derivative status. 129 Since one of the aims of
U.S. refugee and asylum law is to comply with international
law,130 it appears contradictory that Congress would not include
parents of child applicants as derivatives of their children in
matters of asylum since the UNHCR has explicitly recognized
such a right under international law. Congress should adopt
statutory language providing parents with derivative asylum
relief to bring the United States into conformity with
international law.
Although providing parents with derivative asylum
eligibility is arguably the most politically feasible option due to
its very narrow application, such a resolution ultimately fails
to provide comprehensive protection to all those vulnerable
children who fear persecution in a country abroad. The
proposed narrow revision to the current derivative asylum
statute would fail to provide protection to U.S. citizen or LPR
children who fear persecution in their parents' home countries,
as these children are not in asylum proceedings and

128 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Procedural Standards for Refugee
Status Determination Under UNHCR's Mandate (Nov. 20, 2003), available at
http://www.unhcr.orglrefworldldocidl42d66dd84.html. Material in the Handbook is not
controlling but is nevertheless useful to the extent that it provides one internationally
recognized interpretation of the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees. In re Acosta, 191. & N. Dec. 211, 221 (1985).
129 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Procedural Standards for Refugee
Status Determination Under UNHCR's Mandate (Nov. 20, 2003), available at
http://www.unhcr.orglrefworldldocidl42d66dd84.html.
130 See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 437 (1987) ("Not only did Congress
adopt the Protocol's standard in the statute, but there were also many statements
indicating Congress' intent that the new statutory definition of 'refugee' be interpreted
in conformance with the Protocol's definition.").
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consequently could not by extension confer legal status upon
their parents. Yet these children would still face de facto
deportation should their parents not be eligible for independent
asylum relief based on the children's fear of persecution in the
parents' home countries.
Accordingly, one avenue of relief for U.S. citizen and LPR
children is the approach taken by the Ninth Circuit in Abebe,
which provided relief to a U.S. citizen child's parent by focusing
on the parent's fear of the persecution she would face for
attempting to protect her child. 131 However, the Ninth Circuit's
and immigration judge's decisions in Abebe are neither binding
on, nor consistent with, the decisions in other circuits or by the
BIA. Furthermore, a U.S. citizen child could not rely on the
constructive deportation theory to provide asylum relief for her
parent. 132 Established legal precedent provides that children
face constructive deportation only when they have no legal
right to remain in the United States upon their parents' denial
of asylum relief. 133 Because a U.S. citizen or LPR child would
still retain the legal right to remain in the United States, the
family could not obtain asylum relief for the parents under the
constructive deportation theory.
B.

A COMPREHENSIVE FIX: THE BIA MUST PROTECT U.S.
CITIZEN AND LPR CHILDREN

Policy concerns associated with derivative asylum are not
fully served merely by adding parents to the list of eligible
derivatives under § 1158(b)(3).134 Whether a child is an asylee,
U.S. citizen, or LPR, if the parent is forced to leave the country,
the child will almost certainly be forced to leave with her.
Therefore, it is essential for the BIA to act to protect all minor
children from being forced to relocate to countries in which
they will live in fear persecution.
In order to prevent the de facto deportation of U.S. citizen
and LPR children who fear persecution in their parents' home
131 Abebe v. Gonzalez, 432 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc); In re Anon (A#
redacted) (Portland, Or., Immigration Court, Dec. 19, 2007) (on file with the Center for
Gender & Refugee Studies, Univ. of Cal., Hastings).
132 See Olowo v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 692, 701 (7th Cir. 2004); Oforji v. Ashcroft,
354 F.3d 609, 615 (7th Cir. 2003).
133 Olowo, 368 F.3d at 701; Ofozji, 354 F.3d at 615.
134 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(b)(3) (West 2009).
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countries, the BIA should issue a memorandum addressing the
necessary standards for granting relief to parents of U.S.
citizen and LPR children. For guidance in issuing this
memorandum, the BIA should turn to the decisions in Abay
and Abebe to develop the criteria outlining what a parent must
show to establish an independent asylum claim premised on
her child's fear of persecution. 135 The BIA should allow a
parent to establish an independent claim for asylum relief
based on a child's fear of persecution in either of two ways: (1)
if the parent shows she would likely suffer physical harm from
attempting to protect her child from persecution, or (2) if the
parent shows she would likely suffer psychological harm by
being forced to witness the mutilation or persecution of her
child.
An individualized assessment based on the proposed
revised BIA standards for parents of U.S. citizen and LPR
children is consistent with immigration proceedings as they
currently operate. By issuing such a memorandum, the BIA
would provide clarity to the courts and alleviate the concerns
associated with U.S. citizen and LPR children who fear
persecution in their parents' home countries. 13G Although
Abebe already speaks to such relief for U.S. citizen and LPR
children, the holding is limited to only one circuit.
Furthermore, the circuits remain inconsistent on the issue of
asylum relief for parents based on their children's fear of
persecution, with some providing various levels of protection,
and some providing none at all. Since the BIA has yet to
address the impact of de facto deportation on U.S. citizen and
LPR children, and in light of the potentially dangerous
consequences such children face, it is urgent that the BIA
swiftly issue a memorandum covering all immigration cases
nationwide.
CONCLUSION

The goal of protecting refugee children is not being served
135 See Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Abay v. Gonzales,
432 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2005); In re Anon (A# redacted) (Portland, Or., Immigration
Court, Dec. 19, 2007) (on file with the Center for Gender & Refugee Studies, Univ. of
Cal., Hastings).
136 The concerns here referred to are those of family unity and protection of the
child, which were addressed in Part II of this Comment.
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by current U.S. immigration law concerning asylum relief. A
child who fears mutilation and other forms of persecution in
her home country is currently subject to de facto deportation in
the event that her parent cannot establish an independent
asylum claim. As a result, parents are being forced to choose
between leaving their children behind in the United States and
taking their children to places where persecution awaits.
Given this stark reality, changes to current U.S. asylum
law are both urgent and necessary. First, in order to ensure
practical protection for asylee children, Congress should amend
the derivative statute to include parents as derivative asylees.
Such a statutory change will immediately provide practical
protection to asylee children. Second, the BIA should issue a
memorandum that addresses the concerns associated with U.S.
citizen and LPR children who fear persecution in their parents'
home countries. The memorandum should state that a parent
can establish an independent right to asylum based on either
the psychological harm she would likely face by witnessing her
child's persecution or the physical harm she would likely suffer
by attempting to protect her child from persecution.
Enacting each of these proposals would promote longstanding, deeply held, U.S. constitutional and public-policy
principles favoring family unity and integrity. Both the
language and the practical effect of U.S. asylum law must be
fixed in order to prevent any mother from again being forced to
make the devastating decision to take her son or daughter back
to a place where the family will live in fear of mutilation and
persecution.
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